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MAYBE SOLDIERS HAVE RIGHTS
AFTR ALL!
Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Loving v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court held
that the separation of powers principle does not preclude Congress
from delegating its constitutional authority to the President to define
the aggravating factors required under the Eighth Amendment to per-
mit the imposition of a statutory death penalty in military capital
cases.2 In reaching its principal holding, the Court assumed that the
cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment3
and the Court's death penalty jurisprudence constitutionally require
the current military capital punishment scheme to include aggravat-
ing factors.4 Having assumed the applicability of the Eighth Amend-
ment, the Court next determined that the delegation doctrine did not
preclude the President from prescribing the constitutionally required
aggravating factors.5 The Court then found that Congress explicitly
exercised its power to delegate authority to the President in three spe-
cific provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),6 and
further, that the President, acting as Commander-in-Chief, did not
need further Congressional guidance in the exercise of that
authority.7
This Note argues that the Court's preliminary assumption-that
Furman v. Georgia:8 and its progeny are applicable in the military con-
text-is the most notable aspect of this case. The Court has never
1 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996).
2 Id at 1751.
3 The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
4 Loving; 116 S. Ct. at 1742.
5 See id. at 1749.
6 The Court found that the provisions of Articles 18, 86(a), and 56 of the UCiJ, 10
U.S.C. §§ 818, 836(a), 856, gave clear authority to the President to promulgate rules re-
garding the governance of the military. See Loving; 116 S. Ct. at 1749.
7 Loving; 116 S. Ct. at 1750-51.
8 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman, the Supreme Court case essentially invalidated as
unconstitutional all state death penalty schemes. See id. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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before squarely held that a soldier has any constitutional rights when
he is court-martialed, or indeed any constitutional rights at all. When
confronted with military issues, the Supreme Court has consistently
adhered to a highly deferential "hands-off" standard of review.9 In
doing so, the Court has rarely hesitated in denying constitutional pro-
tections to members of the armed forces. 10 What is thus most striking
about Loving is that the Court declined to follow its customary course
of deference to the military at the expense of otherwise applicable
constitutional norms. Instead, the Court suggested that the require-
ments of the Eighth Amendment as articulated in Furman apply to the
military's justice system." Two of the concurring opinions reflect the
controversial nature of the Court's assumption: Justice Thomas di-
rectly questioned the assumption that the Eighth Amendment consti-
tutional requirements of Furman apply to the military.12 On the other
extreme, four Justices, in a concurrence authored by Justice Stevens,
questioned the extent to which capital cases should even fall within
courts-martial jurisdiction.' s
This Note addresses the Court's typically deferential approach to
military issues and suggests that the Court's deviation from that stance
might best be understood as a recognition by the Court that the tradi-
tional standard of deference may be inappropriate in a military capital
case, given the realities of today's military establishment and the un-
precedented recent expansion of courts-martial jurisdiction.
II. BACKGROUND
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN MILITARY LAW
1. Origins of Military Law
The military justice system predates the United States Constitu-
tion by at least several hundred years. Military judges existed as least
as early as the Roman Empire, when Roman soldiers were subject to
the absolute will of their commanders.14 In England, after the Nor-
man Conquest, military justice was a matter of Royal prerogative. 15
Richard Coeur de Lion's Ordinance of 1190 deterred brawling among
his crusaders by punishing offenders with "a series of penalties rang-
9 See infra notes 108-143 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 108-143 and accompanying text.
11 Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1742.
12 See id. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring).
13 See id. at 1751-52 (Stevens,J., concurring).
14 Medieval law shared with Roman law the understanding that the king or other war
commander could exercise unlimited powers of discipline in the command of his troops.
SeeJOSEPH W. BisHoP, JR., JUSTICE UNDER FIRE 3-4 (1974).
15 See id., at 4.
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ing from fines and ignominious expulsion from the army, to tarring
and feathering, loss of a hand, and burial alive."' 6 The first compre-
hensive articles of war were promulgated by Richard II in 1385.17 The
Articles of 1385 "punished a variety of military offenses, such as diso-
bedience of orders, pillage, and theft . . . with penalties that
progressed from amputation of the left ear for minor transgressions to
hanging, drawing and beheading" for major offenses. 18 In the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries, these crude beginnings were im-
proved upon with the implementation of more elaborate and less
barbarous military codes. The codes, 19 issued by military commanders
acting under royal commission, were not fixed; rather, "each war,
each expedition had its own edict" whose jurisdiction was limited to
that particular expedition. 20 These codes governed the conduct of
soldiers in times of war; however, in times of peace, "[t] he Common
Law made no distinction between the crimes of soldiers and those of
civilians .... All subjects were tried alike by the same civil courts
"21
Parliamentary law began to govern military justice in 1689, when
William and Mary, in need of a standing army and the power to secure
its discipline, accepted the Bill of Rights which required Parliament's
consent to the raising and keeping of armies. 22 In 1689, Parliament
passed the Mutiny Act, which provided for the establishment of a
standing army, as well as provisions for its discipline.2 3 The Mutiny
Act, however, gave courts-martial very limited jurisdiction.2 4 Courts-
martial jurisdiction applied only to regular soldiers, and only to




'9 Examples of these codes include the Articles of War of the Free Netherlands of 1590
and Gustuvus Adolphus's Articles of War of 1621. Id. Gustavas' Articles of War of 1621
contained 167 articles and provided for formal court-martial proceedings. See Walter T.
Cox I, The Army, The Courts, and The Constitution: The Evolution of Military Justice, 118 MIL.
L. REv. 1 (1987). Gustavus' Articles "inaugurated the history of modem military justice."
BISHOP, supra note 14, at 5. They, in effect, formalized recognition of "the four moral
virtues necessary to any army: order, discipline, obedience and justice," and are the foun-
dation of military justice today. Norman G. Cooper, Gustavus Adolphus and MilitarqJustie,
92 Mu. L Rav. 129, 137 (1981) (quoting BARBARA W. TACHMAN, A DISTAr MIRROR 576
(1978)).2 0 J. PIPON &J. COLLIER, MANUAL OF MImARY LAW 14 (3d rev. ed. 1863).
21 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 24 n.44 (1956).
22 BISHOP, supra note 14, at 6.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 8.
25 Id. The Mutiny Act of 1689 declared that "noe Man may be forejudged of Life or
Limbe or subjected to any kinde of punishment by Martiall Law or in any other manner
then by theJudgment of his Peeres, and according to the Knowne and Established Laws of
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The Framers of the United States Constitution were mindful of
the limits Parliament set on the peacetime jurisdiction of courts-mar-
tial over capital crimes. Having themselves been subjected to the in-
temperance of military power in the colonies, the Framers were also
aware of the dangers of autocratic military justice, and thus, harbored
a deep distrust of military tribunals. 26 Among the wrongs cited in the
Declaration of Independence were the subordination of civil power to
the military, the quartering of troops in times of peace, and the com-
mission of innumerable cruelties through the hands of the King's
mercenaries.2 7 Indeed, the Revolutionary War was fought, in part, as
a protest against standing armies.28 The experience of the Revolu-
tionary War provided the background for what would become the
"standing army" debate at the Constitutional Convention over
whether to have a standing army or a militia.29 Having rebelled
against oppressive British Rule, many citizens feared the maintenance
of a peacetime army.30 At the same time, however, many citizens saw
the War as evidence that the new nation needed a strong standing
army.31 Such thoughts were upper most in the minds of the Founding
Fathers in 1775, when they passed the first legislation of the Continen-
tal Congress, which dealt extensively with discipline in the military.32
The Framers expressly distrusted the notion of a standing army.3 3 Yet,
recognizing the need for a means to discipline the troops swiftly and
without the required formalities of civilian justice, the Continental
Congress adopted the American Articles of War, which authorized a
national armed force. 34
this Realme. . . Soldiers ... who shall desert Their Majestyes Service be brought to a more
Exemplary and speedy Punishment than the usuall Forms of Laws will allow .... [and] shall
suffer Death or such other Punishment as by Court-Martiall shall be inflicted." Id. at 7
(citing Mutiny Act, 1 Wm. & Mary, ch. 5 (1689)).
26 See Reid, 354 U.S. at 27-28.
27 Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 183-84 (1962).
28 Id
29 The phrase "standing army" can be understood as a permanent, professional peace-
time army. In contrast, a militia, or "armed citizenry... composed of free independent
citizens.., would band together to defend themselves as necessary; as soon as peace was
restored, they would return to their homes and regular occupations." Stephanie A. Levin,
The Deference That is Due: Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Judicial Deference to the Military, 35
VIL. L REv. 1009, 1024 (1990).
30 Id. The standing army debate was between the federalists, who favored a professional
military, and the anti-federalists, who favored a militia. Id. at 1033-35.
31 Id. at 1031.
32 2Jou tALs OF THE CONIMNENTAL CONGRESS 1775, at 111,June 30, 1775 (1905).
33 Warren, supra note 27, at 184 (quoting MADISON, FEDERALIST No. 41, at 251 (Lodge
ed. 1888)).
34 The American Articles of War were based on the British Articles of War, which, in
turn, had their origin in the military codes promulgated by King Gustavus in 1621. See
BISHOP, supra note 14, at 5. The Articles of War underwent major amendment in 1776,
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The Framers' distrust of unmitigated military power found ex-
pression in the Constitution, which provided for the careful diffusion
of the war powers between the three separate branches of govern-
ment.3 5 The Framers purposely provided a separate court system for
the armed forces and did not include military courts in Article III,
which established the federal judiciary.36 Instead, Congress estab-
lished courts-martial 37 under its Article I powers,38 which grant Con-
gress the authority to "make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces."3 9 Historically, the function
of the military justice system was to ensure disciplined troops, and the
court-martial was a tool that could be used at the commander's com-
plete discretion to instill fear and obedience in his soldiers. 40 The
prevailing view among military commanders and politicians alike was
that in order to be effective, military justice must be swift and harsh.41
Throughout the 1800's, commanders of the military accepted and vig-
orously defended the brutal nature of militaryjustice. 42 Despite some
failed attempts to reform manifest deficiencies in the military justice
system,43 interest in reform did not develop for almost another
1786, 1806, 1874, 1916, 1920, and 1948. Among the changes were the reduction of the
number of members required to convene a general court-martial, changes in the designa-
tion of officers empowered to convene courts-martial, and the addition of a field officer
court-martial, precursor of the summary court-martial. David Schlueter, The Court-Martiak
An Historical Survey, 87 MIL. L. RE%. 129, 131-44 (1980) (tracing the present day system of
military discipline to the Roman Empire).
35 The Founders recognized that the exigencies of military discipline would require a
different balance of individual rights and government interests than is appropriate for civil-
ian society. Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1953).
36 See i& at 140.
37 A court-martial is a military court for trying and punishing both military offenses and
those common law crimes listed in the UCMJ. CHARLES A. SHANOR & P. TERRELt, MILITARY
LAw 80-95 (1980). Jurisdiction is entirely penal and disciplinary; only criminal charges are
tried by court-martial. Id. The court-marital must have jurisdiction both over the person
and the offense. ki
38 U.S. CoNsr., art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
39 Id. Congress began establishing these rules and regulations, along with courts-mar-
tial for their enforcement, in 1775 with the Articles of War and continued updating them
until the adoption of the UCMJ in 1950. See WILAM WINTHROP, MiumAR LAw AND
PRECENDENT 21-24 (2d ed. 1920).
40 See Steven J. Carroll, A Pmposal for Streamlining the Military Justice System, 36 NAVAL L
REV. 187 (1986).
41 BISHOP, supra note 14, at 21. In an attempt to combat desertion during the Revolu-
tionary War, for example, General George Washington ordered public execution of desert-
ers with mandatory attendance by the members of the condemned soldier's unit in order
to emphasize the gravity of the offense. SeeWalter T. Cox I, The Army, The Courts, and The
Constitution: The Evolution of Military Justice, 118 Mit. L. RE%, 1, 6 (1987).
42 Cox, supra note 19, at 6.
43 John O'Brien wrote a treatise on military law while he was a lieutenant in the Army,
advocating a "complete revision of the American Articles of War... to make the military




In the early part of the twentieth century Brigadier General Sa-
muel T. Ansell, the acting Judge Advocate General of the Army, pro-
posed a drastic change to the 1916 Articles of War.45 Critical of the
Army's lack of a formal appeals process for courts-martial convictions
and the lack of disciplinary and sentencing uniformity throughout the
different command units, Ansell advocated creation of a centralized
mandatory review system in the form of an appellate tribunal.46 An-
sell's proposals, however, were not adopted in the 1920 Articles due
largely to the opposition of Provost Marshall General Crowder, the
principal author of the 1916 articles and an outspoken defender of
the then-existing system.47
During World War II, the nation witnessed its largest military mo-
bilization in history.48 More than 16 million men and women volun-
teered for, or were conscripted into, active military service.49 By the
end of the war, military courts had convened over two million courts-
martial,50 and the tens of thousands of citizens who had been sub-
jected to the military's system of discipline returned to tell stories of
the grave injustices perpetrated by the military courts.51 Widespread
disenchantment with the military justice system finally instigated a
movement towards reform,52 which culminated in the enactment of
The Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice (UCMJ) in 1950.53 The enact-
ment of the UCMJ represented the first significant change in the ad-
ministration of military discipline in the American armed forces since
the adoption of the Articles of War by the Continental Congress in
1775.54 The primary drafter of the UCMJ, Professor Edmund Mor-
gan, had served under General Ansell and incorporated into the
UCMJ many of the reforms first proposed by General Ansell over four
MilitaryJustice: Removing the Probability of Unfairness, 63 U. GIN. L REv. 439, 447 (1994).
44 Id. at 446.
45 General S.T. Ansell was a major influence in the development of our current system
of military discipline. Terry Brown, The Crowder-Ansell Dispute: The Emergence of General Sa-
muel T. Ansell, 35 Mu.. L. REv. 1 (1967).
46 Id. at 4.
47 Barbara S. Hundley & Frederic I. Lederer, Needed: An Independent MilitayJudiciary-A
Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 3 WM. & MARY BiLL Rrs. J. 629, 636-37
(1994).
48 Keith M. Harrison, Be All You Can Be Without the Protection of the Constitution, 8 Hu.v.
BrAcKLErrERJ. 221, 227 (1991).
49 Id.
50 Andrew M. Ferris, Military Justice: Removing the Probability of Unfairness, 63 U.CIN. L.
Ray. 439, 450 (1994).
51 Harrison, supra note 48, at 227.
52 Id at 228.
53 UCMJ, ch. 169, 64 Star. 108 (1950) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1976)).




Among the changes brought by the adoption of the UCMJ was, as
its title suggested, uniformity among the several services. For the first
time in the nation's history, the procedural and substantive law of mil-
itary discipline was to be the same in all of the military services.56 In
addition, the UCMJ created a centralized review panel in each of the
armed forces which had jurisdiction to hear the appeals of defendants
whose sentences had reached certain jurisdictional thresholds.5 7 The
UCMJ also created the Court of Military Appeals, a three member
panel of civilian judges having jurisdiction to hear mandatory appeals
in cases involving the death penalty.58
2. Expansion of Court-Martial Jurisdiction
Debate over the proper jurisdiction of military courts extends
back to the birth of American military law in the 17th century.59 The
British Articles of War gave military courts jurisdiction over both mili-
tary and civilian offenses,60 as did the American Articles of War.61 The
Framers, however, were wary of military jurisdiction.62 This distrust
led the Framers to delegate to Congress the power to make rules for
the military.6 3
Despite the Framers' concern for limiting military power, from
55 Hundley & Lederer, supra note 47, at 635.
56 Prior to the enactment of the UCMJ, the conduct of soldiers had been regulated by
the Articles of War, the conduct of sailors and marines by the Articles for the Governance
of the Navy, 34 U.S.C. § 1200, and the conduct of the Coast Guardsmen by other laws, 14
U.S.C. §§ 561-76 (1946) (Supp. IV 1951). The Air Force had been independent of the
Army in 1947 and the existing Articles of War were made applicable to the Air Force in
1948. Pub. L. No. 80-775, 62 Stat. 1014 (1948).
57 The UCMJ originally required that any sentence that included the death penalty be
reviewed by a Board of Review, 50 U.S.C. § 653 (1946) (Supp. IV 1951). In 1968, the
Boards of Review were re-named as the Courts of Military Review. Military Justice Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968). Review of a death penalty sentence is
mandatory. 10 U.S.C. § 861 (1988).
58 In 1989 Congress amended the UCMJ to create two additional seats on the Court of
Military Appeals to bring total active membership to five. Defense Authorization Act, Pub.
L No. 101-1189 § 1301(c) (1989).
59 Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 446 (1987).
60 Icd at 443.
61 1& at 444.
62 Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the Framers were "wary of military
jurisdiction"just as the British were suspicious of courts-martial jurisdiction in the 17th and
18th centuries).
63 See id. at 441. The Constitution gives Congress the power and the responsibility to
define and punish offenses against the law of nations, declare war, raise and support ar-
mies, provide and maintain a navy, make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces, provide for calling forth the militia, provide for organizing, arming
and disciplining the militia, and make all laws which may be necessary and proper to exe-
cute these powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10-18.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
1866 to 1960, courts-martial jurisdiction was based solely on military
status-whether the accused was a member of the "land or naval
forces."64 Thus, a service-member could be tried by courts-martial for
any crime, irrespective of a connection to his status as a service-
member.65
In 1969, the Court reigned in the authority of courts-martial
judges by imposing the service-connection test set out in O'Callahan v.
Parker.66 In O'Callahan,Justice Douglas, writing for a five member ma-
jority, denied court-martial jurisdiction in a case involving the off-base
assault and attempted rape of a civilian victim. 6 7 For the first time, the
Court recognized that the status of an accused as a member of the
"land or naval forces," without more, is insufficient to subject the ac-
cused to court-martial jurisdiction.68 Moreover, the Court held that a
crime must be "service-connected" for it to fall under the military's
jurisdiction.69 The Court intended to prevent "'cases arising in the
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service time of
War or public danger,' as used in the Fifth Amendment .... [from
being] expanded to deprive every member of the armed services of
[due process benefits of] indictment by a grand jury and trial by ajury
of his peers."70 Noting that the military justice system lacked these
important constitutional protections, Justice Douglas described
courts-martial as "singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of
constitutional law."7' Although O'Callahan did not exhaustively define
"service-connection," the Court did note that courts-martial jurisdic-
tion existed in cases involving a "flouting of military authority, the se-
curity of a military post, or the integrity of military property."72
Soon after its decision in O'Callahan, the Court provided more
specific guidelines for the basis of courts-martial jurisdiction in Re/ford
v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks.7" Relford, a serviceman sta-
tioned in New Jersey in 1961, had been convicted for the abduction
64 Solorio, 483 U.S. at 439 (citations omitted). One pre-1969 decision of the Court sug-
gests that the constitutional power of Congress to authorize trial by court-martial must be
limited to "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." United States ex. Toth
v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955). The Court in Toth was addressing Congress' authority
over the courts-martial and whether an ex-serviceman may be tried by court-martial for
crimes committed while in the Air Force.
65 Solorio, 483 U.S. at 439.
66 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
67 Id. at 274.
68 Id. at 267.
69 Id. at 273.
70 Id at 272-73.
71 Id. at 265.
72 Id. at 274.
73 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
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and rapes of two relatives of other servicemen. 74 While serving his
sentence in Fort Leavenworth, Relford sought relief from civilian
courts in the form of a writ of habeus corpus. His petition was dis-
missed by the district court as well as the circuit court. 75 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari on the issue of the retroactivity of
O'Callahan.76 The Court ultimately rejected Relford's petition for
habeus corpus, but used the opportunity to clarify the criteria for de-
termining whether a member of the armed forces had committed a
'service-connected' crime.77 Having thus laid out the evaluative crite-
ria, the Court found that Redford's crime was indeed service-con-
nected and that the military tribunal properly exercised its
jurisdiction. 78
For seventeen years following the Relford and O'Callahan deci-
sions, courts-martial were specifically restricted to service-connected
cases. Then, in 1987, the Court again addressed the scope of court-
marital jurisdiction in Solorio v. United States.79 In Solorio, the Court
overruled the service-connection rule, holding that a member of the
armed forces could be tried by a court-martial for any offense regard-
less of its service-connection. 80 Solorio involved a Coast Guardsman
charged with sexually molesting the young daughters of two fellow
guardsmen while on active duty in Juneau, Alaska. 81 The offenses al-
legedly occurred in a civilian community where both Solorio and his
victims lived due to a shortage of government housing.82 The inci-
dents were discovered after Solorio's transfer to New York, where a
general court-martial was convened to try him for the alleged crimes
in Alaska.83 At his military trial, Solorio challenged the jurisdiction of
74 Id at 365.
75 Relford v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 409 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1969).
76 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
77 Reford, 401 U.S. at 367-70. The 12 factors that would tend to defeat court-martial
subject matter jurisdiction as enumerated in Relford are: (1) the serviceman's proper ab-
sence form the base; (2) the crime's commission away from the base; (3) its commission at
a place not under military control; (4) its commission within U.S. territory and not in an
occupied zone of a foreign country; (5) its commission in peacetime and its being unre-
lated to authority stemming from the war power, (6) the absence of any connection be-
tween accused's military duties and the crime; (7) the victim's not being engaged in
performance of any duty relating to the military; (8) the presence and availability of a
civilian court in which the case may be prosecuted; (9) the absence of any flouting of
military authority;, (10) the absence of any threat to a military post; (11) the absence of any
violation of military property; and (12) the offense being among those traditionally prose-
cuted in civilian courts. Id.
78 Id. at 361.
79 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
80 Id. at 436.
81 United States v. Solorio, 21 M.J. 512, 514 (C.G.C.M.R. 1985).




the court-martial over the Alaskan offenses, claiming that they were
not service-connected under the principles established in O'Callahan
and Reford.8 4 The military judge dismissed the Alaskan offenses, and
the government appealed his ruling.8 5 The Coast Guard Court of Mil-
itary Review8 6 and the Court of Military Appeals8 7 both held that the
Alaskan offense were service-connected. Solorio then successfully pe-
titioned for review by the Supreme Court8s to determine "whether the
jurisdiction of a court-martial convened pursuant to the Uniform
Code of MilitaryJustice (UCMJ) to try a member of the Armed Forces
depends on the 'service-connection' of the offense charged."8 9 In af-
firming the military Appellate Courts, the Supreme Court held that
not only were the Alaskan offenses within the jurisdiction of a court-
martial, but any conduct committed by any active-duty member of the
armed forces, in any location, can constitutionally be the subject of
court-martial jurisdiction.90 The only test for court-martial jurisdic-
tion, the Court held, was the status of the accused. 91 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, an outspoken critic of the O'Callahan and Redford deci-
sions, authored the Court's opinion in Solorio,9 2 and disagreed with
the O'Callahan Court's analysis of the historical precedents of Ameri-
can courts-martial. 93 In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens deemed
the overruling of O'CaUahan and Relford both "unnecessary" and "un-
wise."9 4 Justice Stevens noted that in his opinion, Solorio's Alaskan
offenses were service-connected and, considering that the government
had not requested that O'Callahan necessarily be reconsidered, "[t] he
fact that any five Members of the Court have the power to reconsider
settled precedents at random, does not make that practice legiti-
mate."95 However, four justices agreed with Rehnquist and the door
was thus closed to jurisdictional defenses based on O'Callahan and
Relford.
After Soloro, the military may assert criminal jurisdiction over any
member whose status is determined to fall into a category enumerated
84 Solorio, 21 M.J. 512 (C.G.C.M.R. 1985).
85 I& at 512.
86 Id.
87 Solorio, 21 MJ. 251.
88 Solorio v. United States, 54 U.S.LW. 3819 (June 17, 1986) (No. 85-1581).




93 "[T]he history of court-martial jurisdiction in England and in this country during the
17th and 18th centuries is far too ambiguous to justify the restriction of Clause 14 which
O'CaUhan imported to it." Id. at 445.
94 Id. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring).
95 Id. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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in Article 2, UCMJ, regardless of the situs of the alleged offense. 96
Jurisdiction in military courts exists principally over active duty mem-
bers, but also extends to various other military-related persons who
are not on active duty.97
3. Courts-Martial Jurisdiction over Capital Crimes
From the first American Articles of War in 1775, Congress al-
lowed court-martial jurisdiction for service members for non-military
offenses only for "[a]ll crimes not capital . *s"98 Construing the
phrase "not capital," Colonel Winthrop, referred to as "the Blackstone
of Military Law"99 stated:
The Articles, by these words, expressly excluded from the jurisdic-
tion of courts-martial, and, by necessary implication, reserves for the cog-
nizance of the civil courts, (in times of peace), all capital crimes of
96 United States v. Solorio, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
97 Article 2(a), UCMJ lists the following as persons subject to the military code:
(1) Members of a regular component of the armed forces, including those awaiting
discharge after expiration of their terms of enlistment; volunteers from the time of their
muster or acceptance into the armed forces; inductees from the time of their actual induc-
tion into the armed forces; and other persons lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty in
or for training in, the armed forces, from the dates when they are required by the terms of
the call or order to obey it.
(2) Cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen.
(3) Members of a reserve component while on inactive-duty training, but in the case
of members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of
the United States only when in Federal service.(4) Retired members of a regular component of the armed forces who are entitled to
pay.
(5) Retired members of a reserve component who are receiving hospitalization from
an armed force.
(6) Members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve.
(7) Persons in custody of the armed forces serving a sentence imposed by a court
martial
(8) Members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Public Health
Service, and other organizations, when assigned to and serving with the armed forces.
(9) Prisoners of war in custody of the armed forces.
(10) In time of war, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.
(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party
or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by, or accom-
panying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the Canal Zone, the com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
(12) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party
or to any accepted rule of international law, persons within an area leased by or otherwise
reserved or acquired for the use of the United States which is under the control of the
Secretary concerned and which is outside the United States and outside the Canal Zone,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
Article 2(a), UCMJ.
98 American Articles of War, 1776, Sec. XVIII, Art. 5, rep inted WINTHROP, supra note 39,
at 971.
99 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957).
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officers or soldiers under whatever circumstances committed- whether
upon or against military persons or civilians. By capital crimes is to be
understood crimes punished or made punishable with death by the com-
mon law, or by statute of the United States applicable to the case-as for
example, murder, arson, or rape100
Congress expanded military jurisdiction and permitted the mili-
tary to try a service-member for the civilian capital offense of murder
for the first time during the Civil War. 10 1 The relevant statute limited
the military's jurisdiction over the offense, however, to "time of war,
insurrection, or rebellion."'0 2 Indeed, the Court held that the statute
had no application when "the civil courts were open and in the undis-
turbed exercise of its jurisdiction." 10 3 Moreover, the Court recog-
nized that in order for a non-military offense to be tried by the
military, the offense had to be one that prejudiced good order and
discipline.104
Subsequently, in 1916, Congress extended courts-martial jurisdic-
tion to specified non-military offenses, such as larceny, robbery, and
assault, irrespective of prejudice to good order and discipline.'0 5 At
the same time, Congress expressly provided that murder and rape
were punishable by death in a court-martial, but also explicitly pro-
vided that "no person shall be tried by court-martial for murder or
rape committed within the geographical limits of the States of the
Union, and the District of Columbia in time of peace."1O6
While Congress extensively revised the Articles of War in 1920,
the provisions relating to the jurisdiction over non-military offenses
remained substantially unchanged until the enactment of the UCMJ
in 1950. In the UCMJ, Congress extended the military's jurisdiction
to try service members for murder and rape within the geographical
limits of the United States for capital offenses in peacetime. 0 7
B. THE COURT'S STANDARD OF DEFERENCE TO THE MILITARY
The Supreme Court has adjudicated constitutional issues arising
in connection with our military forces since the earliest days of our
nation. 10 8 Repeatedly confronted with the inevitable incompatibility
100 WINTHROP, supra note 39, at 721 (citations omitted).
101 Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 233 (1959).
102 Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 513 (1878).
103 Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S.,376, 386 (1920) (quoting Coleman, 97 U.S. at 515).
104 Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696, 698 (1882) (stating that "the gravamen of the military
offense... was not simply an assault with intent to kill, but an assault by a soldier on duty
with intent to kill [a federal prisoner] over which he was standing guard.").
105 Articles of War, 1916, art. 93.
106 Articles of War, 1916, art. 92 (emphasis added).
107 10 U.S.C. §§ 918, 920(a).
108 See, e.g., The Prize Case, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) (challenge to validity of Presi-
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between the military and individual liberty, the Court's response has
been to consistently consent to whatever curtailment of liberty the mil-
itary believed to be required. 10 9 A review of recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence illustrates the Court's deferential standard of review for
constitutional claims against the military. In Parker v. Levy,"1° Army
Captain Howard Levy challenged his court-martial convictions for vio-
lations of Article 133 ("conduct unbecoming an officer and a gen-
tleman") and 134 ("disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good
order and discipline in the armed forces") of the UCMJ. i x' Levy was
Chief of Dermatology at the United States Army Hospital in South
Carolina during the Vietnam War.'1 2 When Levy was ordered to train
special forces aide men, he refused on the basis that his medical ethics
prohibited such a practice. 113 He also made a series of public state-
ments to enlisted men at the base, expressing his strong opposition to
the war and his opinion that he and others should refuse to obey or-
ders to go to Vietnam." 4
Levy challenged his convictions under Article 133 and 134 on the
grounds that these articles were both void for vagueness under the
Fifth Amendment and overbroad in violation of the First Amend-
ment." 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that "'as measured by contemporary standards of vagueness a-
plicable to statute and ordinances governing civilians,' [Article 133
and 134] 'do not pass constitutional muster.' "116 Reversing the deci-
sion of the court of appeals, the five-Justice majority opinion authored
by justice Rehnquist articulated a conception of the military as a "spe-
cialized society separate from civilian society,"117 subject to different
norms and independent of the constitutional restraints which apply to
civilian life." 8 In Parker, the majority re-emphasized again and again
that military life calls for a different standard of constitutional review
dent Lincoln's blockade of Southern ports); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858)
(challenge to jurisdiction of Navy court-martial); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19
(1827) (challenge to validity of call-up of militia member during War of 1812).
109 Indeed, until the Supreme Court indicated in Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953),
that court-martial proceedings could be challenged through habeus corpus actions
brought in civil courts, the Court adhered consistently to its holding in Ex parte Val-
landigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall) 243 (1863), that it lacked jurisdiction to review, by certiorari,
the decisions of military courts. See Warren, supra note 27, at 187.
110 417 U.S. 733 (1974).III I& at 740.
112 Id- at 737.
113 Id,
114 Id at 736-37.
115 Id. at 752.
116 Id. at 741 (quoting 478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973)).





Brown v. Glines 20 and its companion case, Secretary of the Navy v.
HufJ2 1 further developed the themes articulated in Parker v. Levy.
Glines and Huff concerned First Amendment challenges to Air Force
and Marine regulations requiring prior approval by commanding of-
ficers before the circulation of any petition. In Glines, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the challenged
Air Force regulations unconstitutionally overbroad because of the pos-
sibility that "virtually all controversial written material" might be sup-
pressed.' 2 2 In an opinion written by Justice Powell and joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist,
the Supreme Court reversed. 123 The opinion cited the language from
Parker which approved the different applications of First Amendment
protections in the military context. 24 Glines proferred "military disci-
pline" in support of the validity of the regulations. 25 Glines thus ex-
tended the deferential standard first announced in Parker into a new
arena. Parker invoked the special demands of the military to permit
limits on First Amendment speech during wartime in the presence of
troops about to enter combat In Glines, the Court extended this same
standard of deference in a peacetime setting.
The Supreme Court again faced the question of deference to the
military in peacetime when President Carter resumed draft registra-
tion in 1980. In Rostker v. Goldberg,2 6 the registration of only males
was challenged as unconstitutional gender discrimination. In Rostker,
the Court denied this challenge 12 7 and again articulated a standard of
deference to the military. 12 8 The Court cited Parker and Glines to sup-
119 See, e.g., id. at 742 (noting that even court of appeals acknowledged in some circum-
stance "different standards might ... be applicable in considering vagueness challenges to
provisions which govern the conduct of members of the Armed forces"); id. at 744 (cita-
tions to various authorities suggesting military society is "a society apart form civilian soci-
ety"); id at 756 (Congress has more latitude in legislating for military than for civilian
society); id at 758 (first amendment to be applied differently to military than to civilian
life); id. at 760 (same).
120 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
121 444 U.S. 453 (1980) (per curium).
122 Glines, 444 U.S. at 353 (quoting Glines v. Wade, 586 F.2d 675, 681 (9th Cir. 1978)).
123 Id-
124 Id at 354 (quoting Parker, 417 U.S. at 758).
125 See, e.g., id. at 352 ("[R]equirements of military discipline could justify otherwise im-
permissible restrictions on speech."); id. at 357 n.14 ("[T]he prior approval requirement
supports commanders' authority to maintain basic discipline."); id. at 360 ("The un-
restricted circulation of collective petitions could imperil discipline.").
126 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
127 i- at 78-79.
128 Id at 64-65. "The case arises in the context of Congress' authority over national
defense and military affairs, and perhaps in no other arena has the Court accorded Con-
gress greater deference." Id
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port the proposition that military matters require a special degree of
judicial deference. 129 The Court declined to apply a "mid-level" scru-
tiny test, its normal approach to sex discrimination,1 30 declaring that
decisions involving military matters need not pass heightened scru-
tiny.13' In the Court's view, judicial deference must be at its maxi-
mum when the Court reviews unconstitutional government action in
the military arena. 132 Consequently, just as the standard for reviewing
free speech claims against the military became more deferential than
the standard in a civilian context after Levy and Glines, so too the stan-
dard for reviewing gender-based discrimination claims against the mil-
itary became much more deferential with Rostker. 33
The Court's standard of deference reached its pinnacle in United
States v. Stanley.'34 In Stanley, the Court denied Sergeant James B.
Stanley redress for injuries he sustained as a result of secret and non-
consensual administration of LSD to him as part of an Army experi-
ment.135 Stanley had volunteered for an Army program he had been
told was designed to test protective clothing and equipment.136 In-
stead, he was given lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) without his
knowledge or consent.' 37 The drug caused severe personality changes
in Stanley that led to his discharge from the service and the breakup
of his marriage. 138 Many years later, when Stanley discovered what
had occurred,' 39 he sued the army for damages, claiming a violation
of his constitutional right to due process of law.14° Stanley's claim
ultimately reached the Supreme Court.141 The Court denied Stanley's
claim, again invoking a highly deferential standard of review for con-
129 id- at 66.
130 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 425 U.S. 190 (1976).
131 Rostker, 453 U.S. at 69.
132 Id.
133 The Court continued to apply this deferential standard of review through the 1980s.
See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 505 (1986) (holding that OrthodoxJew had no
First Amendment right to wear a yarmulke while in uniform; "Our review of military regu-
lations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional
review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society."); Chappell v. Wallace,
462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (denying 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim for alleged racial discrimination
in the military context; "unique disciplinary structure of the Military Establishment" makes
a civil damage remedy against superior officers inappropriate).
'34 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
135 Id. at 68384.
136 Id. at 671.
137 Id.
138 Id
139 Stanley became aware of his unwitting participation in these experiments in 1975,
when the Army sent him a letter soliciting his participation "in a study of the long-term
effects of LSD on 'volunteers who participated' in the 1958 tests." Stanley, 483 U.S. at 671.
140 Id. at 678.
141 479 U.S. 1005 (1986).
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stitutional claims against the military.142 The majority, consistent with
its position in earlier cases, held that military institutions must be per-
mitted to make their own evaluations of the requirements of military
discipline, whatever the costs in civil liberties. 143 In Stanley, the court
maintained this broad deference to military judgment even though it
resulted in the denial of liability for secret, non-consensual experi-
ments on human beings. The Stanley case indicates the full matura-
tion of the notion, first articulated in Parker, that the military is a
separate community subject to norms different from those of civilian
life.
C. SUPREME COURT DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE
The underlying assumption of modem Eighth Amendment juris-
prudence can be summarized simply: death is different.144 The
Supreme Court first gave precedential weight to the distinction be-
tween death and lesser punishments in its landmark ruling, Furman v.
Georgia.145 Furman invalidated the statutory capital punishment
142 Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683-84.
143 Id. at 683.
144 The unique status of the death sentence was long recognized before the landmark
decision in Furman v. Georgia. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 285-291 (1972) (Bren-
nan,J., concurring) (summarizing prior doctrinal distinction between death sentences and
lesser punishments and stating that because of unusual severity, enormity, and finality,
death is a class by itself); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (Stevens, Stewart,
Powell, Z., concurring) (stating that five members of the Court expressly recognized
"death is different" doctrine in early Eighth Amendment cases that provided dual require-
ments for constitutionally valid capital sentencing procedures). See also B. NAKELL & K.
HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY 29-37 (1987). As Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence evolved in cases where capital sentencing was at issue, individual members
of the Supreme Court began to adopt the concept that death should be treated differently
from all other punishments. Of those Justices currently on the Court, Justice Stevens en-
dorsed the distinction in his opinion in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980) (noting
that "significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punish-
ments" is that death requires imposition based on reason not emotion).
Justice O'Connor, shortly afterjoining the Court, also adopted the "death is different"
doctrine:
Because [death] sentences are 'qualitatively different' from prison sentences.., this
Court has gone to extraordinary measures to ensure that a prisoner sentenced to be
executed is afforded process that will guarantee, as much as humanly possible, that the
sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake.
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court re-
viewed three cases in which each petitioner had been sentenced to death pursuant to his
state's respective statutory scheme. In Furman, the petitioner was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death pursuant to GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971). Id. at 239. In
Jackson v. Georgia, the petitioner was convicted of rape and sentenced to death in accord-
ance with GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1032 (Supp. 1972). Id. In Branch v. Texas, the petitioner




schemes of three states as violative of the Eighth Amendment prohibi-
tions against cruel and unusual punishment.14 The Court struck
down these statutes because the sentencing portions did not guard
against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death pen-
alty.147 Although the Court was unable to muster a majority, or even a
plurality, 148 the decision effectively invalidated the capital punishment
schemes of every state permitting the death penalty. 149
Prior to Furman, definitive standards for imposing the death pen-
alty were non-existent, allowing the sentencing judge or jury total dis-
cretion in imposing death sentences. 150 Although Furman did not
provide express guidelines for imposing a valid death sentence, the
message of the majority was clear: the Court would strike down as un-
constitutional statutes that allowed juries unguided and unfettered
discretion in imposing capital sentences. 151 In the wake of Furman,
states began drafting new death penalty statutes in an attempt to com-
port with the mandates of Furman.152 The Court reviewed several of
these statutes together in 1976.153 In the "76" cases, as they later be-
came known, the Court elaborated on the abstract dictates set forth in
Furman and established guidelines for constitutional death sentencing
procedures. 54 The decisions in Gregg v. Georgia,155 Proffitt v. Flor-
146 Id. at 238.
147 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
148 The per curium decision generated nine separate opinions. Each of the fivejustices
who voted to overturn the death penalty wrote a separate opinion. Justices Brennan and
Marshall advocated total abolition of the death penalty as a per se violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 305 (Brennan,J., concurring), 370 (Marshall,J., concurring). Justices
Stewart, id. at 310, White, i& at 314, and Douglas, id. at 248, found the statutes unconstitu-
tional because they gave juries too much discretion in imposing sentences. ChiefJustice
Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun dissented in the case, finding the
statutes constitutionally valid. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 413-14, (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), 464-65 (Powell, J., dissenting), 468 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 417 (Powell,J., dissenting). For further discussion on the impact of the Furman
decision, see Kathryn Hailer, Note, Capital Punishment Statutes After Furman, 35 OHIO ST.
L.J. 651 (1974).
150 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 339 & n.74 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing Hugo Adam
Bedau, The Courts, the Constitution, and Capital Punishment,1968 UTAH LPRtv. 201, 204).
151 See, e.g., id. at 248-49 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 291-95 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
152 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 n.23 (1976). Thirty-five states re-drafted
their capital punishment statutes in response to Furman. Id.
153 In 1976, the Supreme Court reviewed five state statutes and upheld three. See Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976). Two decisions invalidated mandatory death sentencing statutes. See
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976).
154 The three approved sentencing statutes all provided for a bifurcated trial, Gregg, 428
U.S. at 163, 197; Proffit4 428 U.S. at 248;Jurek, 428 U.S. at 267; guidance to thejury on the
weight of aggravating factors, Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248-50; Jurek, 428
U.S. at 276; and appellate review, GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(a) (1975) (current version in
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ida,156 andJurek v. Texas,157 three of the so-called "76 cases," were an-
nounced on the same day.158 In each case, the Court declared
constitutional the sentencing statute because each assured that the
sentencing authority would receive sufficient information and gui-
dance to produce principled and fair sentencing. 59
D. APPLICATION OF 'URMANTO COURTS-MARTIAL
It is unclear how the Eighth Amendment applies to the military.
The question of the Eighth Amendment's applicability has been gen-
erally limited to the type of punishment allowed. 160 The Justices who
comprised the Furman majority did not indicate that they contem-
plated applying the decision to courts-martial. The Furman dissenters,
outraged at the sweeping holding, did assert that it affected provisions
of the UCMJ, 16 1 but the majority failed to respond to these assertions.
In 1973, the D.C. Circuit reviewed a military death sentence that had
been commuted to life imprisonment before Furman was decided. 62
In dicta, the court noted that Furman had invalidated the military sen-
tencing statute, article 118.163 The Supreme Court, hearing the case
on appeal, did not decide this question specifically, but indicated that
the Furman concern of arbitrariness might not be a problem in mili-
tary courts.'6
1978) (recodified at § 17-10-35 (1982)), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West 1976-77) (cur-
rentversion in West 1982), TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art 37.071(f) (West 1975-76) (current
version in West 1981).
155 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
156 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
157 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
158 The Court announced five death penalty decisions that day. The Court struck down
as unconstitutional two death penalty statutes in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976), and Roberts v. Lousiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
159 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 248-50; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276.
160 See UCMJ art. 55, which states that "[p]unishment by flogging, or by branding,
marking, or tattooing on the body, or any other cruel or unusual punishment, may not be
adjudged by any court-martial or inflicted upon a person subject to this chapter...." 10
U.S.C § 855 (West 1996).
UCMJ art. 55 did not derive from the Eighth Amendment, but from the 41st Articles
of War. Historically, this article was not intended to apply Eighth Amendment protections
to service-members, but rather to outlaw earlier barbarous punishments. Frederick
Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice , 72 HARv. L REv.
266, 284-90 (1958).
161 Furman, 408 U.S 238, 412 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 417-18 (Powell, J.
dissenting).
162 Schick v. Reed, 483 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973), afid, 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
163 I& at 1270.
164 Schick, 419 U.S. at 260, 268 ("[D]oes [Furman] apply to death sentences imposed by
military courts where the asserted vagaries ofjuries are not present in other criminal cases?
Our disposition of the case will make it unnecessary to reach [this] question." I& at 260.
Justice Marshall argued the very opposite, urging Furman s applicability and stating- "Noth-
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The only military appellate court to review the constitutionality of
the UCMJ capital sentencing scheme assumed without question that
the concerns of Furman and the guidelines of Gregg apply in military
courts. 16 5 In United States v. Matthews, the Court of Military Appeals
(CMA) affirmatively stated that the Bill of Rights applies to the mili-
tary. Matthews involved Private First Class (PFC) Wyatt Matthews, who
was sentenced to death by a general court-martial for the rape and
murder of an American civilian in Germany.166 The court acknowl-
edged that "there may be circumstances under which the rules gov-
erning the capital punishment of servicemembers will differ from
those applicable to citizens."16 7 Nevertheless, the CMA concluded
that the crimes that Matthews committed had "no characteristics
which, for purposes of applying the prohibition against 'cruel and un-
usual punishments,' distinguish them from similar crimes tried regu-
larly in State and Federal courts."16 8 Having determined that there
was no "military necessity" for distinguishing courts-martial capital
sentencing procedures from their civilian counterparts, 169 the CMA
applied Supreme Court precedent to the military justice system.'70
Upon reviewing Supreme Court precedent, the Matthews court
found that constitutionally valid death penalty statutes shared certain
common features, including a bifurcated sentencing procedure, the
presence of aggravating factors, and the opportunity for the defend-
ant to present unlimited extenuating and mitigating evidence. 171
Based upon this analysis, the CMA upheld as valid most of the death
penalty procedures followed in courts-martial; however, the CMA did
find one fundamental defect: the failure of the UCMJ or the RCM to
require that courts-martial members "specifically identify the aggravat-
ing factors upon which they have relied in choosing to impose the
death penalty."' 72 In light of this defect, the court reversed Matthews'
death sentence, but stated in dicta that either Congress or the Presi-
dent could lawfully remedy the defect in the UCMJ capital sentencing
scheme.173 The President, not Congress, subsequently acted to cor-
ing in Furman suggests that it is inapplicable to the military. The per curium carves out no
exceptions to the prohibition against discretionary death sentences. The opinions of the
five-member majority recognize no basis for excluding the members of the Armed Forces
from protection against this form of punishment." Id. at 271 n.5 (Marshall,J., dissenting)).
165 United States v. Matthews, 13 M.J. 501, 521 (A.C.M.R. 1982).
166 United States v. Matthews, 16 MJ. 354, 359, 361 (C.M.A. 1980).
167 Id at 368.
168 Id. at 369.
169 Id. at 369.
170 Id. at 377-78.
171 Id. at 377.
172 Id. at 379.
173 Id. at 380-82.
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rect the defective sentencing procedure by promulgating Rule for
Courts-Martial (RCM) 1004.'7 RCM 1004 was intended to rectify the
deficiency by enumerating established procedures for capital cases, 175
including a list of aggravating factors which determine death penalty
eligibility.176
E. THE CURRENT UCMJ CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SCHEME
The UCMJ permits the imposition of the death penalty for eleven
purely military offenses177 and three traditional common law crimes:
premeditated murder,178 felony murder, 79 and rape. 80 The only of-
fense carrying a mandatory death penalty is wartime spying; all others
are permissive, namely: premeditated murder, murder committed in
the course of certain felonies, rape, mutiny, certain types of espio-
nage, and certain other wartime offenses. 181 As of the 1996 Supreme
Court term, Congress had not revised the death sentencing provisions
of the UCMJ since the Code was enacted.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of December 11, 1988, Dwight Loving, an Army
Private stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, robbed at gun-point two 7-
Eleven convenience stores in the town of Killeen.18 2 When the two
robberies netted him only ninety dollars, Loving conceived a plan to
174 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, (1995 ed.). RCM 1004 had actually
been circulated for public comment prior to the Matthews decision and it was specifically
cited in the Matthews opinion. Matthews, 16 Mj. at 381.
'75 RCM 1004 requires a unanimous finding that the accused is guilty of a capital of-
fense before a death sentence may be imposed. RCM 1004(a) (2). The Rule also requires
unanimous findings that at least one aggravating factor is present and that any extenuating
or mitigating circumstances are substantially outweighed by any admissible aggravating fac-
tor. RCM 1004(b) (4) (A). The Rule also provides that the accused is to have "broad lati-
tude" in extenuation and mitigation, RCM 1004(b) (3), and is entitled to have members of
the courts-martial instructed to consider all such evidence before deciding upon a death
sentence. RCM 1004(b) (6).
176 RCM 1004(c).
177 The eleven military offenses for which the death penalty is permitted by the UCMJ
are: desertion in time of war, art. 85; assaulting or willfully disobeying a superior commis-
sioned officer in time of war, art. 90; mutiny or sedition, art. 94; misbehavior by a
subordinate compelling surrender, art. 100; improper use of a countersign in time of war,
art. 101; forcing a safeguard, art. 102; aiding the enemy, art. 104; spying in time of war, art.
106; espionage, art. 106(a); and misbehavior of a sentinel in time of war, art. 113.
178 10 U.S.C.A. § 918(1) (West 1996).
179 10 U.S.CA. § 918(4) (West 1996).
180 10 U.S.CA § 920(a) (West 1996).
181 R.C.M 1004 (b)(1).
182 Respondent's Brief at 4, Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1737 (1995) (No. 94-
1966).
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rob taxicab drivers.183 On the following evening, December 12, 1988,
Loving called a taxicab to take him from a store in Killeen to his bar-
racks at Fort Hood. 84 The driver of the taxicab was an active-duty
soldier, Christopher Fay.' 85 Loving directed Fay to a secluded area
where he robbed Fay at gun-point and then shot him twice in the back
of the head, killing him.18 6 Loving then walked to his barracks and
callled another taxicab after counting the money he received from
Fay.187 The second cab was driven by retired sergeant Bobby
Sharbino.' 88 Loving directed Sharbino to a secluded area, robbed
him, and then shot him in the head, killing him.' 89 Later that eve-
ning, Loving took his girlfriend to a nightclub in Killeen.' 90 Upon
leaving the club, the two entered a taxicab driven by Howard Harri-
son. 19 After dropping his girlfriend off near her home, Loving di-
rected Harrison to a secluded area and robbed him at gun-point. 92
He then attempted to shoot Harrison.19 3 A struggle ensued during
which Harrison was able to disarm Loving and flee.' 94
Acting on leads provided by Harrison, civilian and Army authori-
ties arrested Loving on the afternoon of December 13, 1988.' 95 Later
that day, Loving confessed to his crimes, including both murders and
the attempted murder. 96
After trial, an eight member general court-martial unanimously
found Loving guilty of the premeditated murder of Sharbino and the
felony murder of Fay under Article 118197 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ)*198 Articles 118(1) and 118(4) authorize the
death penalty for premeditated and felony murders.' 99 By a non-
unanimous vote, the court-martial also found Loving guilty of attempt-
ing to murder Harrison, of robbing Sharbino and Harrison, and of
robbing the 7-Eleven stores.200 After trial, a sentencing hearing was












195 Id. at 5-6.
196 United States v. Loving, 41 MJ. 215, 230 (C.A.AF. 1994).
197 10 U.S.C. §§ 918(1), (4) (1980).
198 Respondent's Brief at 6, Loving (No. 94-1966).
199 10 U.S.C. §§ 918(1), (4) (1980).
200 Respondent's Brief at 7, Loving (No. 94-1966). In addition, Petitioner was found
1997]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
conducted in accordance with RCM 1004.201 During sentencing, the
court-martial found three aggravating factors: first, the premeditated
murder of the second driver was committed during the course of a
robbery;20 2 second, Loving acted as the triggerman in the felony mur-
der of the first driver,20 3 and third, Loving, having been found guilty
of the first murder, had committed a second murder.204 The court-
martial unanimously sentenced Loving to death.20 5 The commander
who convened the court-martial approved the findings and sen-
tence.20 6 The United States Army Court of Military Review denied
Loving's petition for reconsideration.20 7 On automatic appeal to the
United States Army Court of Military Review, Loving argued two main
points: first, Article 118 of the UCMJ was unconstitutional under
Furman in that the provision does not sufficiently narrow the class of
death-eligible defendants; 20 8 and second, the President exceeded his
constitutional authority in promulgating RCM 1004 to provide spe-
cific aggravating factors.20 9 The United States Army Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces (formerly the United States Court of Military
Appeals (CMA)) affirmed the lower court's decision,210 finding Lov-
ing's claims foreclosed by United States v. Curtis21' and United States v.
Matthews.212 Loving then petitioned the Supreme Court for certio-
rari.213 Loving's certiorari petition challenged the constitutionality of
the military death penalty scheme on three fronts. First, he argued
that Congress cannot constitutionally delegate the authority to pre-
guilty of the premeditated murder of Fay, and the felony murder of Sharbino. After the
findings were announced, the military judge dismissed those specifications as multiplic-
itous. Id. at 6 n.2.
201 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (1995 ed.).
202 Rules for Court-Martials (RCM) 1004(c) (7) (B).
203 RCM 1004(c)(8).
204 RCM 1004 (c) (7) (J). See Loving v. United States, 116 S. CL 1737, 1740 (1996).
205 United States v. Loving, 41 M.J. 213, 232 (CAA.F. 1994).
206 Loving 116 S. CL at 1740.
207 United States v. Loving, 34 M.J. 1065, 1067-69 (A.C.M.R. 1992) (holding that (1)
accused was not denied effective assistance of appellate counsel; (2) trial defense counsel's
decision not to present involuntary intoxication or lack of mental responsibility defense
was a matter of trial strategy;, and (3) accused had no right to appellate defense counsel of
a particular rank).
208 Loving, 41 M.J. at 293.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 32 MJ. 252, 257-69 (C.MA 1991) (holding that the establishment of aggravating
factors by the President was constitutional).
212 16 M.J. 354, 379, 380 (C.M.A. 1983) (holding that the existing military capital sen-
tencing scheme was unconstitutional because there was no requirement that the court
members make specific findings as to individualized aggravating circumstances).
213 See Loving v. United States, 116 S. CL 1737, 1740 (1996).
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scribe aggravating factors in capital murder cases to the President.21 4
Second, even if Congress could, it neither implicitly nor explicitly del-
egated to the President the authority to prescribe aggravating fac-
tors.2 1 5 Third, even if certain statutory provisions of the UCMJ can be
construed as delegations, they lack the requisite intelligible principle
to guide the President's discretion.2 16 The United States Supreme
Court then granted certiorari 217 to determine whether the President's
prescription of aggravating factors violated the separation of powers
principle.218
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, holding that the
President's promulgation of the aggravating factors required by the
Eighth Amendment did not violate the separation of powers princi-
ple.2 1 9 In reaching its principal holding, the Court started with the
assumption that the constitutional requirements of the Eighth
Amendment apply to courts-martial capital punishment schemes.220
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,22' began his analysis
with a brief historical sketch of the American military capital punish-
ment scheme.2 22 Before turning to Loving's specific constitutional
challenges, Justice Kennedy traced the expansion of courts-martial ju-
risdiction from the early days of the Republic, when Congress enacted
the first Articles of War,223 through 1984 and the President's promul-
gation of RCM 1004.224
The Court quickly dispatched the issue of the necessity of aggra-
vating factors in military capital sentencing schemes. Assuming that
Furman v. Georgia 225 and its progeny applied to the instant case, the
214 Petitioner's Brief at 5, Loving v. United States, 116 S. C. 1737 (1996) (No. 94-1966).
215 I. at 16.
216 Id. at 6.
217 Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 39 (1995).
218 Id.
219 Loving v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 1751 (1996).
220 Id. at 1742.
221 ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg and Breyerjoined in
Kennedy's opinion. Justices O'Connor and Scaliajoined in all but Part IV-A of Justice
Kennedy's opinion. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment.
222 Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1741-42.
223 Congress enacted the first Articles of War in 1789. Id. at 1741.
224 The President issued an Executive Order promulgating RCM 1004 in 1984. Id. at
1742. For a more detailed look at the history of the military's capital punishment scheme
see supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
225 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition
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Court found the existing military capital punishment scheme constitu-
tionally deficient in that it did not narrow the death-eligible class in a
way consistent with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.226
In order to ensure UCMJ Article 118's constitutional validity, the
Court reasoned, additional aggravating factors establishing a height-
ened culpability were necessary.2 27
The Court turned next to the question of whether the separation
of powers doctrine precluded Congress from delegating to the Presi-
dent its authority to prescribe aggravating factors.228 The Court out-
lined the purposes of the separation of powers doctrine and its
corollary, the delegation doctrine, as threefold: (1) to defend against
arbitrary and tyrannical rule, (2) to create an effective and accounta-
ble government, and (3) to prevent Congress from forsaking its du-
ties.2 2 9 The Court then posited two of the fundamental precepts of
the separation of powers doctrine: (1)"that one branch of govern-
ment may not intrude upon the central prerogatives of another,"230
and (2) that Congress may not convey its lawmaking function to an-
other branch or entity.2 3 1 Drawing upon the writings of the Fram-
ers,232  and separation-of-powers jurisprudence,233  the Court
concluded, however, that the doctrine did not mean that the different
branches of government "ought to have no partial agency in, or no
controul [sic] over the acts of each other,"234 or that only Congress
may make a rule of prospective force.2335 Rather, the Constitution
gives Congress flexibility to exercise or share power as the times might
demand, and to "burden Congress with all federal rulemaking would
divert that branch from more pressing issues, and defeat the Framers'
design of a workable National Government."236
At this point, the majority turned to a detailed exposition of Eng-
lish constitutional history and its impact on the governmental struc-
of the death penalty under procedures that create a substantial risk that it will be inflicted
in an arbitrary manner).
226 Loving, 116 S. Ct. at 1742.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 1742-43.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 1743 (citations omitted).
231 Id. at 1744 (citing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
232 Id. at 1743 (quoting THE FEDERAUST No. 47, at 325-36 (James Madison) (J. Cooke
ed., 1961)).
233 Id. at 1743-44.
234 Id. at 1743 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380-81 (1989) (citations
omitted)).




ture erected by the Framers of the Constitution.237 In tracing English
military justice from the Norman Conquest through the 17th century,
the Court acknowledged the impact this history had on the Framers'
thoughts.2 38 However, the Court rejected Loving's contention that
the Framers' mistrust of military excesses led to an intention to grant
Congress an exclusive, nondelegable power to determine military
punishments.2 39 As interpreted by the Court, the lesson learned by
the Framers from the English constitutional experience was not, as
Loving argued, to deprive Congress the services of the Executive to
establish rules for the governance of the military.240 Rather, "[ f] rom
the English experience the Framers understood the necessity of bal-
ancing efficient military discipline, popular control of a standing
army, and the rights of the soldiers ... "241 The power to regulate the
armed forces, the Court reasoned, was given to Congress "without lim-
itation: Because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and
variety of national exigencies, or the corresponding extent & variety
of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them ... "242 Accord-
ingly, there was no reason why Congress should not be able to dele-
gate to the President the authority to prescribe the aggravating factors
which allowed Loving to be sentenced to his death.243
Having determined that Congress rightfully exercised its power
of delegation, the Court turned to the second prong of Loving's con-
stitutional challenge: even if Congress had the authority to delegate to
the President the authority to promulgate aggravating factors, Con-
gress did not implicitly or explicitly do so.244 The Court rejected Lov-
ing's contention, finding permissible Congress' delegation to the
President under Articles 56245, 36246, and 18247 of the UCMJ. 248 The
237 Id. at 1745-49.
238 Id.
239 See id at 1744. Loving contended that the Framers, mindful of the military excesses
of the Crown in colonial America, harbored a deep distrust of executive military power,
and thus, intended that Congress alone should have the power to make rules for the regu-
lation of the Armed Forces. Petitioner's Brief at 42-43, Loving v. United States, 116 S. Ct.
1737 (1996) (No. 94-1966).
240 Loving; 116 S. Ct. at 1745.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 1748 (quoting THE FEDERAusr No. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis
omitted).
243 Id.
244 Petitioner's Brief at 16, Loving (No. 94-1966).
245 Article 56 specifies: "The punishment which a court-martial may direct for an offense
may not exceed such limits as the President may prescribe for that offense." 10 U.S.CA
§ 856 (West 1996).
246 Article 36 provides: "Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of
proof, for [courts martial] ... may be prescribed by the President by regulations which
shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evi-
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Court noted that since 1950, when the UCMJ was enacted, the Presi-
dent has often used his authority under these articles to refine military
sentencing within statutory bounds.249 This past practice, the Court
maintained, suggests that the President had clear authority to pre-
scribe capital aggravating factors. 250
Lastly, the Court rejected Loving's argument that Congress failed
to provide guiding principles to the President in prescribing aggravat-
ing factors, finding no need for such guidance "given the nature of
the delegation and the officer who is to exercise the delegated author-
ity."251 Congress, the Court noted, may delegate its power to set sen-
tencing standards, so long as it provides "intelligible principles" for
the establishment of punishments. 252 The requirement of an "intelli-
gible principle" seeks to enforce the delegation doctrine's primary
precept: to prevent Congress from conveying away its lawmaking func-
tion.253 In this case, however, the Court found that the intelligible
principle requirement was unneccessary as the delegated authority
was already within the scope of presidential duties under his role of
Commander-in-Chief.2 54 Moreover, the Court noted, the President
has had congressional authority to intervene when courts-martial have
ordered death sentences since the early days of the Republic.2 55 It
would thus be inconsistent, the Court reasoned, to question the com-
petency of the President to prescribe aggravating factors absent an
intelligible principle in this instance.256
B. JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE
In a concurrence, 257justice Stevens clarified that, while joining in
the Court's result, he did not thereby accept the proposition that
dence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts,
but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter." 10 U.S.CA § 836(a)
(West 1996).
247 Article 18 states that a court-martial "may, under such limitations as the President
may prescribe, adjudge any punishment not forbidden by [the UCMJ], including the pen-
alty of death when specifically authorized by [the UCMJ]." 10 U.S.CA § 818 (West 1996).
248 Loving, 116 S. CL at 1749.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 1750.
252 Id (quotingJ.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
253 Id. (citing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693-694 (1892)).
254 Id. The President's duties as Commander-in-Chief require him to superintend the
military, including the courts-martial. Id.
255 Id. at 1751.
256 Id.




Solorio v. United States258 must be understood to apply to capital of-
fenses.259 Having determined that a "service-connection" had indeed
been established in this case,260 Justice Stevens joined in both the
Court's analysis of the delegation issue and its disposition of the
case. 261 For Justice Stevens, however, the important question of
whether a "service-connection" requirement should apply in capital
cases remained open.262 First, Justice Stevens noted that Solorio was
not a capital case. 263 In addition, Justice Stevens asserted that Solorio's
limited review of the historical backgfound in fact undermined any
contention that a military tribunal's power to try capital offenses must
be as broad as its power to try non-capital offenses.264 The issue, Ste-
vens noted, is significant in ensuring that members of the Armed
Forces are not, by reason of their service, entitled to fewer constitu-
tional protections than those afforded civilians. 265
C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
In a concurring opinion,266 Justice Scalia joined in the majority
opinion except with respect to the Court's discussion of English his-
tory.267 Justice Scalia deemed the discussion irrelevant to determining
the limits of Congress's power.268 The history surveyed by the Court
258 438 U.S. 435 (1987) (holding that jurisdiction of courts-martial depends solely on
accused's status as a member of the armed forces, and not on the "service connection" of
the offense charged. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment of Solorio but wrote sepa-
rately, id. at 457, to object to the unnecessary and unwise overruling of O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), which had stood for the principle that court-martial jurisdic-
tion depends on the "service connection" of the offense charged).
259 Loving 116 S. Ct. at 1752 (Stevens, J., concurring).
260 Id- at 1751 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens noted that petitioner's first vic-
tim was a member of the Armed Forces on active duty and that the second was a retired
serviceman who gave petitioner a ride from the barracks on the same night as the first
killing. Id.
261 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
262 Id (Stevens, J., concurring).
265 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
264 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 442-46
(1987)).
265 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Interestingly, Justice Stevens raises the very same con-
cem that was the basis ofJustice Marshall's ardent dissent in Solorio in which Stevens did
not join. In his dissent, Justice Marshall decried the overruling of O'Callahan which re-
quired "that, to be subject to trial by court-martial, a criminal offense charged against a
member of the Armed Forces had to be 'service connected,' lest the phrase 'cases arising
in the land or naval forces' in the Fifth Amendment 'be expanded to deprive every mem-
ber of the armed services of the benefits of an indictment by a grand jury and a trial by a
jury of his peers.'" Solorio, 483 U.S. at 452 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 273 (1969)).
266 Justice O'Connor joined injustice Scalia's concurrence.
267 Loving 116 S. Ct. at 1752 (Scalia,J., concurring).
268 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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well-established the permissible scope of courts-martial jurisdiction
over certain classes of offenses and defendants. 269 However, Justice
Scalia pointed out, Loving did not question the jurisdiction of the
court.270 Loving's argument dealt with Congress' delegation of au-
thority to the President to prescribe the aggravating factors which al-
lowed the court-martial to impose the death penalty.27 1 The response
to Loving's argument, Scalia contended, resides not in English his-
tory, but rather, in the text of the Constitution.272 Accordingly, the
majority's historical exposition was of no consequence to the issue
before the Court and should have been "left aside."273
Justice Scalia also took issue with the Court's practice of referring
to Congress' assignment of responsibilities to the Executive as "delega-
tions of legislative authority."274 Justice Scalia pointed out that the
term "delegations of legislative authority" is misleading because such
"delegations" can not, by definition, constitutionally exist.275 Con-
gress is strictly prohibited by the Constitution from "delegat[ing] its
legislative authority."276 Rather, as Justice Scalia clarified, "Congress
assigns responsibilities to the Executive, and when the Executive un-
dertakes those assigned responsibilities, it acts, not as a "delegate" of
Congress, but as the "agent of the people."277
D. JUSTICE THOMAS' CONCURRENCE
Although Justice Thomas concurred unequivocally in the Court's
judgment,278 he wrote separately to suggest that the question of
whether the Eighth Amendment vis-a-vis Furman applies to the mili-
tary still remains unanswered. 279 Unlike the majority, which assumed
that Furman applied to the instant case, Thomas remained skeptical
that the rules developed under the Eighth Amendment for the prose-
cution of civilian cases, including the requirement of proof of aggra-
vating factors, apply to capital prosecutions in the military.280 Justice
Thomas agreed with the majority's result without deciding whether
269 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
270 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
271 I. (Scalia, J., concurring).
272 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). "The Congress shall have power... To make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces"; U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, ci.
14.
273 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
274 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
275 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
276 Id- (Scalia, J., concurring).
277 Id. at 1758 (Scalia, J., concurring)..
278 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
279 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
280 Id- (Thomas, J., concurring).
[Vol. 87
EGHTH AMENDMENT/MILITARY
capital courts-martial require aggravating factors.281 In light of Con-
gress' express constitutional authority to regulate the Armed
Forces,2 82 Thomas contended, "the sentencing scheme at issue in the
case, and the manner in which it was created, are constitutionally
unassailable."28 3
Justice Thomas also agreed with Justice Scalia's characterization
of the historical analysis conducted by the majority.2 84 Justice Thomas
expanded upon Justice Scalia's point and noted, not only the irrele-
vance of the exercise,285 but also the "simplistic" and speculative con-
clusions that the majority drew regarding the significance of English
military history to the Framers' allocation of constitutional
authority.2 86
V. ANALYSIS
In Loving v. United States, the Supreme Court assumed that the
constitutional requirements of the Eighth Amendment apply to the
military. This Note argues that the Court's assumption holds far more
significance than the Court's passing reference to it might suggest.
Never before has the Court squarely held that service-members retain
Eighth Amendment protections, or indeed any of the same constitu-
tional rights that they are commissioned to defend.2 87 Faced with mil-
itary issues, the Court has consistently eschewed careful scrutiny of
military restrictions on service-members' constitutional rights and has
instead assumed a highly deferential standard of review. The Court's
uncharacteristic assumption in Loving thus signals a long overdue rec-
ognition that the realities of today's military create a need for in-
creased constitutional safeguards and have outgrown the Court's
tradition of supine deference. This Note analyzes the historical un-
derpinnings of the Court's tradition of deference to the military and
argues that the realities of the modem military render the Court's
rationales wholly obsolete.
A. OUTDATED STANDARD OF DEFERENCE
The Supreme Court has stated that service-members have consti-
281 Id. (ThomasJ, concurring).
282 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 14.
283 Loving 116 S. Ct. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).
284 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
285 Id. at 1753 (ThomasJ, concurring).
286 Id. at 1754 (Thomas, J., concurring).
287 In Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974), the Court faced the very same issue confronted
in Loving-"whether [Furman applies] to death sentences imposed by military courts." The
Court chose not to address the issue, stating "our disposition of the case will make it unnec-
essary to reach [that] question." IA at 260.
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tutional rights, even if the exigencies of military service constrain
those rights.288 However, historically, the Court has generally re-
frained from questioning the decisions of military courts, instead de-
ferring to congressional decisions on appropriate disciplinary
procedures.28 9 Deference to military decisions and the deprivation of
service-member's constitutional rights which often accompanies it, has
long been the Supreme Court's rule of decision.m °
The Court has justified its "healthy deference to legislative and
executive judgments in the area of military affairs"2' on three sepa-
rate bases: first, the doctrine of separation of powers mandates such
deference; 292 second, the military's unique status as a separate com-
munity requires a narrow judicial role; and third, the inherent inabil-
ity of the judicial system to competently scrutinize the competing
288 See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). Holding that enlisted service members
could not maintain a suit for monetary damages against their superior officers for alleged
constitutional violations, Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous court, stated:
"[O]ur citizens may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their
civilian clothes."... This court has never held, nor do we hold now, that military personnel
are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the
course of military service." Ie at 304.
289 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Congress'
legislative judgment in making rules for the regulation of the armed forces is "not subject
to revision by the independent judgment of the Court."); Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S.
296, 298, 306 (1911) (The discharge board "was military in character and having had juris-
diction of the subject-matter and of the person the civil courts were withoutjurisdiction to
review its decision." Further, the Judiciary has no power to "command or regulate the
army" and therefore no jurisdiction to review military court decisions.); Kurtz v. Moffitt,
115 U.S. 487, 500 (1885) (noting that court-martial proceedings cannot be "controlled or
revised" by the civilian courts); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866) ("The
discipline necessary to the efficiency of the army and navy, required other and swifter
modes of trial than are furnished by the common-law courts; and in pursuance of the
power conferred by the Constitution, Congress has declared the kinds of trial, and the
manner in which they shall be conducted, for offenses committed while the party is in the
military or naval service."); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863) (Supreme
Court lacks jurisdiction to review by certiorari the decision of military courts); Dynes v.
Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79-81 (1857) (stating that military courts are completely
separate from the Article IIJudiciary, and that congress can provide for military trial and
punishments as other civilized nations do). In Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738
(1975), the Court further limited federal intervention ip. the military justice system, stating
that Congress has "never deemed it appropriate to confer on this Court appellate jurisdic-
tion to supervise the administration of criminal justice in the military. Nor had Congress
conferred on any Art. III court jurisdiction directly to review courts-martial determina-
tions." Id. at 746. The Court further noted that that "this Court repeatedly has recognized
that, of necessity, 'Military law.., is ajurisprudence which exists separate and apart from
the law which governs in our federal judicial establishments.'" I& (citations omitted).
290 See supra notes 108-143 and accompanying text.
291 Goldberg; 453 U.S. at 66.
292 See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 103 (1983). See also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57, 58 (1981) ("[Iun deciding the question before us we must be particularly careful
not to substitute ourjudgment of what is desirable for that of Congress, or our own evalua-
tion of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch").
924 [Vol. 87
1997] EIGHTH AMENDMENT/MIITARY 925
military interests renders judicial review inappropriate.2 93 Invoking
these three justifications, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that the military can restrict civil liberties more than is permissible in a
civilian setting.294 Indeed, such notions have been used to justify
stricter limits on free speech,295 rights to free exercise of religion,296
rights to petition the government,297 and a different standard of pro-
cedural due process.298 However, given the realities of the modem
military, the Supreme Court's deferential standard of judicial review
and corresponding refusal to extend constitutional rights doctrine to
the military is obsolete.
1. Separation of Powers Rationale
Among the traditional justifications for the Judiciary's deference
to the Military, the Supreme Court has stated that some form of defer-
ence is constitutionally mandated by the doctrine of separation of
powers.2 99 The Judiciary occupies a sensitive position when it reviews
military cases. Explicit constitutional powers have been granted to
both the executive and the legislative branches of government,300 but
the Judiciary is without a specific constitutional grant. The Court has
invoked this constitutional scheme to explain its deference to the
293 See, e.g., Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305. See also Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)
("It is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less
competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, train-
ing, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judg-
ments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches"). Id.
294 See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974), where the Court stated:
While the members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by
the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and the mili-
tary mission requires a different application of those protections. The fundamental
necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline,
may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally imper-
missible outside it.
295 See id. at 733.
296 See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
297 See Secretary of Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. 453, 458 (1980) (upholding Huff's conviction
for violating a Navy regulation by circulating, off-base in South Korea, a petition critical of
the South Korean government, without prior command approval).
298 See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1953) (courts-martial not intended by the
Founders to be analogous to civilian courts, or to comply with all civilian court
procedures).
299 See, e.g., Chappel 462 U.S. at 301 (stating "[i]t is clear that the Constitution contem-
plated that the Legislative Branch have plenary control over rights, duties and responsibili-
ties in the framework of the Military Establishment, including regulations, procedures, and
remedies related to military discipline; and Congress and the Court have acted in conform-
ity with that view").
300 "The Congress shall have Power... To declare War... To raise Armies... To
provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for.., the land and naval Forces ... ." U.S.
CONsT. art I, § 8, cls. 11-13. "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States .... " U.S. CONsr. art n1, §2, cl. 1.
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other branches of government in military matters.3 01 Although the
Supreme Court has refused to abandon completely its power of re-
view,302 the Court has considered the Constitution a plenary grant of
power, which should not be subjected to any unjustified second guess-
ing by the Judiciary.303
Although the Judiciary is without an explicit constitutional grant
to review military cases, the Judiciary is nonetheless always obliged to
decide "[c]ases... arising under [the] Constitution, [and] the laws of
the United States ... 3 04 Since Marbury v. Madison,30 5 it has been the
function of the Judiciary and not the political branches to delimit the
bounds of permissible governmental conduct and the scope of consti-
tutionally protected rights.306 When a military regulation conflicts
with a constitutionally guaranteed individual fight, it is the Judiciary's
duty to safeguard the Bill of Rights.30 7 The principal of deference,
however, is diametrically opposed to this tradition;30 8 it represents a
complete abdication of the traditional judicial function.3 09 When the
Judiciary defers to military decision-makers, it dangerously aggran-
dizes the military's power to influence not only military personnel, but
the nation as a whole.310
2. Separate Community/Military Necessity Rationale
The Court frequently cites the military's status as a separate com-
301 See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 458 U.S. 57, 66 (1981).
302 See id. at 67 (stating that the Court does not abdicate its ultimate responsibility and
power to review constitutional questions); Chappell 462 U.S. at 304-305 ("[t]his Court has
never held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress in
civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service").
303 See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 67 ("[i]n deciding the question before us, we must be particu-
larly careful not to substitute our judgment of what is desirable for that of Congress, or our
own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch").
304 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
305 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
306 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 523-24 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
307 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch) (1803) (establishing the principle of
judicial review and that the Court has the obligation of being the final arbiter of
constitutionality).
308 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
309 Id. at 513-14.
310 Perhaps the most grievous lesson of the dangers of deference to militaryjudgment is
found in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Korematm, the Supreme Court
upheld the relocation and internment of 120,000 persons ofJapanese ancestry in defer-
ence to the "professional judgment" of Military officials, the President, the War Depart-
ment, and the Congress that the move was necessary for national security. Since the
internment, Korematsu's conviction for failure to cooperate with the authorities has been
overturned, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Korematsu II), and Congress has apolo-
gized to those interned and provided restitution to them. Restitution for World War II
internment ofJapanese-Americans and Aleuts Act, 50 U.S.CA. App. §§ 1989a-1989d (West
Supp. 1989).
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munity as a justification in support of it principle of deference.31'
The "separate community doctrine" focuses on the distinct purpose of
the armed forces-to protect the United States, and its interests,
against the actions of foreign nations, through the use of force.3 12
The military's unique purpose, with its fundamental requirements for
obedience and discipline, makes "permissible within the military that
which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it."313 More-
over, the doctrine proffers, military effectiveness demands peacetime
preparation.3 14 The Supreme Court has thus recognized a "necessity"
for more latitude when dealing with military personnel and military
infrastructure.3 15 Recognizing the importance and distinction of this
responsibility, the Court has granted the Military significant leeway in
training and supervising its personnel with reduced regard for consti-
tutional liberties.3 16 Without such constitutional license, the Court
has reasoned, the military might not effectively instill in its service-
members those qualities necessary for victory in war.3 17
The Court's "separate community" rationale for deference is in-
appropriate given that it is founded on notions of the Military that no
longer comport with reality. The military society of the past no longer
exists. The modem military establishment is a major arm of the gov-
ernment, with jurisdiction over 3.5 million United States citizens, in-
cluding not only individuals on active duty, but also reservists and
compensated retirees.318 The great bulk of servicemen perform cleri-
311 See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 744 (1974); Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140
(1953). For an in-depth analysis of the concept of the separate community, see Hirschorn,
The Separate Communiy: Military Uniqueness and Servcemen's Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C.L.
RE%. 177 (1984).
312 "[I] t is the primary business of the armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars
should the occasion arise." United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
3i1 The Supreme Court has consistently permitted the military to restrict the conduct of
service members in ways which would clearly violate the Constitution outside the confines
of the military's "separate society." See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Chap-
pell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296,300 (1983); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980); Parker
v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 758-59. See also Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975)
("the military must insist upon a respect for duty and commitment without counterpart in
civilian life").
314 Goldman, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
315 "The inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience to orders cannot be
taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate compliance with military procedures and
orders must be virtually reflex with no time for debate or reflection ... [C]onduct in
combat inevitably reflects the training that precedes combat." Chappe/, 462 U.S. at 300; see
also Goldman, 475 U.S. at 508 ("the necessary habits of discipline and unity must be devel-
oped in advance of trouble").
316 See Parker, 417 U.S. at 758-59 (stating "the different character of the military commu-
nity and the military mission requires a different application of [constitutional] protec-
tions"). See also Goldman, 475 U.S at 507; Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300.
317 Parker, 417 U.S. at 758-59.
318 Note, Military Justice and Article 1T, 103 HARv. L. Ram. 1909 (1990).
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cal, maintenance, and service jobs that never expose them to combat
conditions. The duties of military computer programmers, truck
mechanics and cooks are not intrinsically different from their civilian
counterparts, nor do they require the full rigors of traditional military
discipline designed to ready soldiers to perform reliably in combat.
Further, the system's once limited subject matter jurisdiction now em-
braces crimes that relate only indirectly to the military and that would
have previously been heard only in civilian courts.31 9
Perhaps the "separate community" was a valid description for the
18th century military society, when armed forces constituted an iso-
lated, homogeneous, voluntarily entered into society. However, even
the Framers did not foresee a modem military of such enormous pro-
portions. When the Framers debated the role of the military in the
new nation, military justice consisted of courts-martial proceedings
with jurisdiction over a 675-man army for purely military offenses.3 20
Even then, the Framers were concerned with preventing the growth of
a large, expensive and powerful military3 21 and were opposed to
courts-martial jurisdiction in times of peace.322 Deeply distrustful of
the notion of a standing army, the Framers specifically provided for
the diffusion of war powers among the separate branches of govern-
ment in order to prevent its creation.3 23 This diffusion of power, how-
ever, did not entirely allay the Framers' distrust. Concern for the
inevitable tension between individual rights and the needs of the mili-
tary also played out in the fight for the Bill of Rights. 3 24 The rights of
civilians against the potential exercise of unmitigated military power
are also clearly espoused in the Constitution.3 25
Yet, the original constitutional approval of a limited courts-mar-
tial system used solely as an instrument of military discipline has been
extended to today's vast and complex system, which confers jurisdic-
tion over millions of persons, some with only a tenuous connection to
the service, for crimes unrelated to the maintenance of military disci-
pline.3 26 The danger that the system will not adequately protect the
319 See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
320 Military Justice and Article Xl2 supra note 318. A few months after Washington's first
inauguration, The United States Army numbered a mere 672 of the 840 authorized by
Congress. Warren, supra note 27, at 187.
321 At the time of the Constitutional Convention, consideration was given to forever
limiting the size of the National Army to a few thousand men through an express constitu-
tional provision. Warren, supra note 27, at 187.
322 See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
323 Warren, supra note 27, at 181.
324 Id at 253.
325 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. II (the right to bear arms); U.S. CONST. amend. HI
(right to refuse quartering of soldiers).
326 Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
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due process rights of military defendants looms large and thus de-
mands more rigorous judicial scrutiny.
3. Judicial Incompetence Rationale
A third justification commonly proffered in support of the doc-
trine of deference centers on the perceived limits of the Court's com-
petence in dealing with the complex aspects of the military
establishment.3 27 In a speech given at the New York Law Center in
1962, then-Chief Justice Earl Warren captured the essence of the in-
competence justification for deference when he stated:
Courts are rn-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any
particular intrusion upon military authority might have. Many of the
problems of the military society are, in a sense, alien to the problems
with which the judiciary is trained to deal.328
The professional judgment and experience of those familiar with
military needs is the primary source for determining the climate of
obedience and discipline necessary to sustain an effective fighting
force. Traditionally, the Court has determined itself incapable of mas-
tering the complexities which are considered when balancing consti-
tutional rights against military functional necessity.329  As a
consequence, the Court argues that the scope of review must be nar-
rowed to reflect this inability of the judiciary to master the complexi-
ties of military ajudication. 330
The tradition of judicial deference began when the military was
composed of a small group of professional soldiers whose training and
activities were primarily combat related. 331 Internal decision-making
generally focused on such uniquely military problems as combat strat-
egy, troop deployment, morale, and discipline.332 In the face of such
narrow and sensitive military concerns, civilian courts feared they
lacked the expertise to assess the impact of their decisions on the
moral and discipline of the troops, and thus refrained from careful
scrutiny of military restrictions on constitutional protections.333
The military, however, has undergone a major evolution from a
327 Warren, supra note 27, at 187.
328 I&
329 See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1988) (stating that the special rela-
tionships which define military life have "supported the military's establishment's broad
power to deal with its own personnel. The most obvious reason is that the courts are ill-
equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon mili-
tary authority might have.").
330 Id.
331 See Daniel N. Zillman & Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Constitutional Rights and Militarj
Necessity: Reflecions on the Society Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 396, 400 (1976).
332 See generally H. Wooi, THE MIIxTARY SPECIALIST 1, 9-25 (1968).
333 Id. at 27-49.
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small, professional, combat-oriented force to an employer of several
million professional and non-professional persons.334 Moreover, post-
World War II alliances such as NATO and SEATO have resulted in
presence of a large number of American troops in foreign countries
during peacetime,33 5 often performing jobs of a civilian nature.33 6
Thus, as the "primary business" of the Military grows to include many
non-combat and civilian-oriented activities, the purpose and impact of
military regulations are no longer limited to narrow, parochial inter-
ests and often intrude within the sphere of civilian comprehension.
When conduct neither interferes with military operations nor under-
mines a specific military concern, sweeping deference to military dec-
sionmaking is unwarranted.
The Court's assertion that its competence is limited by military
complexities is also unconvincing given the complex, technical and
non-legal issues which courts regularly consider. Why should the
Court consider itself any more competent in dealing with a complex
and intricate security matter than it does balancing constitutional
rights against the needs of the military? Indeed, the Judiciary is
uniquely qualified to balance the values embodied in individual con-
stitutional rights against even genuine military necessity. Only the
courts are experts in constitutional law, and their view of the proper
constitutional balance should therefore prevail.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Loving v. United States, the Court assumed that the constitu-
tional requirements of the Eighth Amendment, as articulated in
Furman v. Georgia, apply to the Military. This assumption was signifi-
cant given the Court's historical reluctance to interfere with the meth-
ods of military procedure. When the Court assumed the applicability
of the Eighth Amendment to the military it did so mindful of the his-
torical necessities and events which have shaped the modem military.
English Constitutional history and its impact upon the thinking of the
framers figured prominently in the Court's opinion, as did the growth
of the Military and the corresponding expansion of courts-martial ju-
risdiction. Indeed, it was an attention to and understanding of this
history and the realities of today's Military which permitted the Court
to deviate from its tradition of supine deference and undertake a
more contemporary balancing of service-members constitutional
rights with military necessity. Given the realties of the modem mili-
334 See Zillman & Inwinkelreid, supra note 331, at 400.
335 WOOL, supra note 332, at 28.
336 Id. at 53.
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tary establishment and the expansive reach of court-martial jurisdic-
don, the Court's assumption was a proper one. Just as the military
establishment has evolved over time, so too should the standards
which govern it.
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